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ON KANSAS V. GLOVER AND THE 
ISSUE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION 
ZACH KUMAR* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is settled law that an officer may initiate a traffic stop when there 
is articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.1 In Kansas v. 
Glover, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to clarify what 
constitutes “reasonable suspicion.” The Court will determine whether 
it is reasonable for an officer to seize a vehicle if the registered owner 
has a revoked license and there is no information to suggest that the 
person driving is the owner of the car.2 
This Commentary argues the Court should uphold the Kansas 
Supreme Court decision and find that the burden of reasonable 
suspicion was not met. Glover turns on whether the fact that a vehicle 
is registered to someone with a revoked license is enough to warrant 
reasonable suspicion. This Commentary posits that, in this instance, the 
State did not meet its burden as it relied on one questionable factor 
that was not based on an officer’s training. More generally, common 
sense and the Court’s own precedent support the idea that the State 
needs more justification to pull over a vehicle than the mere fact it is 
registered to someone with a suspended or revoked license. The current 
standard for reasonable suspicion is so slight that there is no need to 
lower it further, and the enhancement in public safety that would result 
from this less demanding standard is outweighed by the social costs of 
increased traffic stops. 
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 1.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). 
 2.  Brief for Respondent at 1, Kansas v. Glover, 139 S. Ct. 1445, (petition for cert. filed Oct. 
25, 2018) (No. 18-556) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
On April 28, 2016, Kansas Deputy Mack Mehrer ran a registration 
check on a 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck with Kansas license plates.3 
Deputy Mehrer discovered the truck was registered to Charles Glover, 
a Kansas resident with a revoked license.4 Mehrer did not witness any 
traffic violations but initiated a traffic stop on the presumption that 
Glover was the driver of the vehicle.5 There was no evidence either 
supporting or rebutting this presumption.6 Deputy Mehrer charged 
Glover with driving as a habitual violator for driving with a revoked 
license.7 Glover filed a motion to suppress all evidence from the stop, 
arguing that his Fourth Amendment protections were violated due to 
Deputy Mehrer lacking reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.8 
B. Legal Background 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.9 It requires law enforcement officers to have 
either a warrant—which requires probable cause—or a well-recognized 
exception to a warrant to seize an individual or conduct a search.10 One 
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when an 
officer can articulate “reasonable suspicion.”11 An officer may stop and 
briefly detain an individual if he has reasonable suspicion, based in fact, 
that the individual in question is committing, has committed, or is about 
to commit a crime.12 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court established 
that there is “no ready test for determining reasonableness other than 
by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which 
the search [or seizure] entails.”13 Reasonable suspicion requires 
“specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
 
 3.  State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 66 (Kan. 2018). 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). 
 11.  Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2014); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–30 
(1968). 
 12.  Terry, 392 U.S at 26. 
 13.  Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
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inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”14 
Reasonable suspicion has a lower standard than probable cause.15 
Terry’s scope has been clarified in subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions. In Delaware v. Prouse,16 the Court held that discretionary 
“spot checks” of vehicles were an unconstitutional violation of Fourth 
Amendment protections.17 However, the Court took care to note that 
its holding “[did] not preclude . . . [s]tates from developing methods for 
spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the 
unconstrained exercise of discretion,” as officers were relying on 
nothing more than their judgment to stop and search vehicles.18 
Additionally, the Court in Whren v. United States19 held that any 
observed traffic violation is a legitimate basis for a stop, regardless of 
the subjective intent of the officer making the stop.20 Terry was further 
expanded in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,21 where 
the Court held it was constitutional to require a suspect to disclose his 
identity during the course of a Terry stop.22 Finally, in Heien v. North 
Carolina,23 the Court held that both mistakes of law and fact can give 
rise to reasonable suspicion.24 
C. Procedural History 
The Kansas state district court granted Glover’s motion to suppress, 
holding that an officer does not have reasonable suspicion under the 
Fourth Amendment to initiate a stop based solely on the fact that the 
car being driven is registered to someone with a suspended license.25 
The court emphasized that it is often true that someone other than the 
registered owner is driving the vehicle.26 
The State appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court’s suppression order.27 The court found that an officer has 
 
 14.  Id. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536–37). 
 15.  Id. at 25. 
 16.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 17.  Id. at 649. 
 18.  Id. at 663. 
 19.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 20.  Id. at 813. 
 21.  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
 22.  Id. at 186. 
 23.  Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014).  
 24.  Id. at 57. 
 25.  State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 67 (Kan. 2018). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  State v. Glover, 400 P.3d 182 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).  
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reasonable suspicion to stop a driver if the officer knows the vehicle is 
registered to someone with a revoked license and there is no “evidence 
or circumstances from which an inference could be drawn that the 
registered owner is not the driver of the vehicle.”28 The court reasoned 
that it is often difficult for an officer to safely verify a driver’s identity, 
and that requiring additional evidence to justify the stop would 
effectively turn the reasonable suspicion standard into something 
resembling probable cause.29 Glover appealed the decision to the 
Kansas Supreme Court.30 
II. HOLDING 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals 
and affirmed the order granting the suppression motion.31 The Kansas 
Supreme Court emphasized that there were no additional facts 
implying that Glover was driving the vehicle at the time of the stop, and 
that the State could have met its burden with the presentation of 
corroborating evidence.32 It held that the State must provide additional 
justification beyond the vehicle being registered to someone with a 
revoked license to show reasonable suspicion.33 To not do so would be 
to “relieve the State of its burden by eliminating the officer’s need to 
develop specific and articulable facts . . . on the determinative issue of 
whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle, not whether the 
vehicle is being driven.”34 
The Kansas Supreme Court highlighted that Deputy Mehrer 
assumed, rather than inferred, that the registered owner of the truck 
was its driver.35 An assumption, the Court posited, has “no basis in 
proof” and is therefore “an inarticulate hunch.”36 Here, Deputy Mehrer 
did not view the totality of information, as he possessed no information 
beyond the fact that Glover was the registered owner of the vehicle and 
that Glover had a revoked license.37 To assume—with no other 
information—that the owner of a car is its driver is to ignore “common 
 
 28.  Id. at 188. 
 29.  Id. at 187. 
 30.  Glover, 422 P.3d at 67. 
 31.  Id. at 64. 
 32.  Id. at 70.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 69. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 68. 
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experience,” as cars are commonly driven by those other than the 
registered owner.38 Additionally, the Kansas Supreme Court held that 
the State’s argument unfairly assumed that those with suspended or 
revoked licenses would continue to drive.39 The State filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court on April 
1, 2019.40 
III. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner, the State of Kansas, argues that the State has met the 
burden of reasonable suspicion.41 Petitioner contends that although it 
is possible for someone other than the registered owner of a vehicle to 
be driving, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the owner is 
driving.42 This argument is supported by precedent, as federal and state 
courts have almost unanimously confirmed that it is reasonable to infer 
the registered owner of a vehicle will do the vast amount of driving.43 
Additionally, studies have indicated that there are, on average, two to 
three drivers for every registered automobile in Kansas.44 This suggests 
a likelihood of at least 33 percent that the registered owner of a vehicle 
in Kansas is driving that vehicle.45 This number, Petitioner argues, is 
more than enough to support reasonable suspicion.46 
Petitioner also notes that neither Terry nor its progeny distinguish 
between assumptions or inferences.47 The question instead is whether 
the facts available to Deputy Mehrer objectively provided reasonable 
suspicion that Glover was breaking the law.48 Petitioner contends they 
do, and that Deputy Mehrer was relying on an inference driven by 
 
 38.  Id. at 69. 
 39.  Id. at 70. 
 40.  Kansas v. Glover, 139 S. Ct. 1445 (Apr. 1, 2019) (No. 18-556) (granting writ of cert.). 
 41.  Brief for Petitioner at i, Kansas v. Glover, 139 S. Ct. 1445, (petition for cert. filed Oct. 
25, 2018) (No. 18-556) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 42.  Id. at 10. 
 43.  Id. (citing State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2010)) (discussing cases from 
twelve state supreme courts and four federal circuit courts of appeals that have reached this 
conclusion). 
 44.  Id. at 13 (citing The 10 States with the Most Suspended/Revoked Licenses, INSURIFY 
(June 4, 2018), https://insurify.com/insights/the-10-states-with-the-most-suspended-revoked 
licenses/). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 14.  
 47.  Id. at 16.  
 48.  Id. at 17. 
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objective facts rather than on an impermissible hunch.49 These facts 
include that Glover was the registered owner of the vehicle, Glover’s 
license was revoked, and driving with a revoked license is illegal in 
Kansas.50 Petitioner argues that it would have been poor police work 
for Deputy Mehrer to ignore these articulable facts, especially 
considering the general truth that registered owners often drive their 
vehicles.51 There was no evidence to suggest that Glover was not driving 
his vehicle, and the reasonable suspicion standard allows officers to 
view the totality of the circumstances in light of their experience.52 
Petitioner emphasizes that reasonable suspicion is not a demanding 
standard.53 Although it requires more than a hunch, it is certainly less 
demanding than a preponderance of the evidence or probable cause.54 
To require “more” or “corroborating” evidence, as the Kansas Supreme 
Court stated, would transform reasonable suspicion into a much higher 
burden.55 
Finally, Petitioner argues that investigative stops are reasonable and 
important to public safety.56 They help keep roads safe with minimal 
intrusion, as they are necessarily short in duration.57 Therefore, they do 
not violate the inherent balance of public interest and an individual’s 
right to security.58 Petitioner emphasizes that courts in twelve states and 
four federal circuit courts of appeals have adopted this logic.59 To 
require officers to ascertain more information on the driver of a vehicle 
is not only unnecessary, but also dangerous.60 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent Glover argues that the State has not met its burden of 
establishing reasonable suspicion of an illegal activity.61 First, 
Respondent emphasizes that the State did not present evidence 
regarding either the circumstances surrounding the stop or Deputy 
 
 49.  Id. at 15. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 19. 
 53.  Id. at 20. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 21. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 22–25. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 25. 
 60.  See id. at 26 (noting the risks involved in having an officer attempt to learn about the 
driver of a car while it is in motion). 
 61.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 8. 
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Mehrer’s experience or training.62 The truck was ostensibly being 
operated legally, and there is nothing illegal about driving a vehicle 
owned by someone with a revoked license.63 These factors, Respondent 
contends, indicate that the State was relying only on the fact that the 
owner of the vehicle had a revoked license to establish reasonable 
suspicion, rather than looking to the totality of the circumstances.64 This 
fact alone is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, as the 
“assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion 
. . . that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing.”65 Here, the “whole picture” was only one fact that did not 
relate to the particular individual being seized.66 Respondent cites 
previous cases where the Court has “declined to accept bright-line rules 
that a single fact is per se sufficient to establish reasonable cause in all 
cases.”67 Respondent contrasts these cases to those in which the Court 
used multiple facts and looked to a totality of the circumstances to find 
reasonable suspicion.68 
Respondent takes little solace in the State’s tautological 
“safeguard” that an officer cannot stop a car based purely on the fact it 
is registered to someone with a revoked license if that officer has 
evidence the driver is not the owner.69 It is inherent that a police officer 
cannot pull someone over on suspicion of driving without a license if 
there is no proof that the person driving has no license.70 Additionally, 
the State has provided no evidence as to how this “safeguard” would 
apply practically.71 
Respondent asserts the State has failed to establish that a police 
officer is always entitled to assume that a car is being driven by its 
registered owner.72 First, the “statistical ‘evidence’” the State relies on 
does not support this inference.73 For example, the State relies on 
statistics that indicate suspended drivers continue to drive while failing 
 
 62.  Id. at 12. 
 63.  Id. at 13. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. at 14–16 (discussing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975) 
and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1979)). 
 68.  Id. at 16–18 (discussing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002), Cortez, 449 
U.S. at 417–422, and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996)). 
 69.  Id. at 18. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 19. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 20. 
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to note the frequency with which they continue to drive.74 Whether a 
suspended driver ever drives with a suspended license is less relevant 
than whether that driver is driving the car at the particular moment in 
question.75 Failing to account for the natural deterrent effect of a 
suspended license renders this statistic meaningless for purposes of a 
case like Glover’s.76 In fact, the State supplied no evidence—either 
through data or Deputy Mehrer’s experience—regarding the extent to 
which drivers continue to drive after their licenses are revoked.77 
Although officers are allowed to rely on reasonable inferences “in light 
of [their] experience[s],” the State presented no evidence that Deputy 
Mehrer’s inferences were based on experience or training.78 
Respondent also rejects the idea that “common sense” leads to a 
reasonable inference that the owner of a car is driving it.79 The Supreme 
Court has historically only used common sense in finding inference-
based reasonable suspicion when that common sense is grounded in the 
training and experience of police officers.80 Here, the State has given no 
evidence that was the case.81 In fact, common sense indicates both that 
the driver of a vehicle is likely not its registered owner and that 
likelihood is contingent on where the vehicle is being driven.82 For 
example, statistics indicate that it is more likely that the owner of a car 
is driving that car in urban areas as opposed to suburban or rural 
areas.83 Since the State’s proposed bright line rule fails to consider 
differences among communities, it makes little sense to institutionalize 
it.84 
Respondent acknowledges that in many cases it will be easy for an 
officer to establish reasonable suspicion.85 A traffic violation, 
corroborating physical characteristics of the driver, or a history of the 
driver in question continuing to drive with a suspended license can all 
 
 74.  Id. at 20–23. 
 75.  Id. at 23. 
 76.  Id. at 22. 
 77.  Id. at 25. 
 78.  Id. at 26. 
 79.  Id. at 28. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 29.  
 83.  Id. (first citing Katherine E. Heck & Keith C. Nathaniel, Driving Among Urban, 
Suburban and Rural Youth in California 13 tbl.2 (2011); then citing Fed. Highway Admin., U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., Summary of Travel Trends: 2017 National Household Travel Survey 96–97 tbl.33 
(2018)). 
 84.  Id. at 29–30. 
 85.  Id. at 35. 
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serve as grounds for an officer to pull over a vehicle registered to 
someone with a revoked license.86 In fact, an officer being able to give 
any explanation as to how his training and experience supported his 
inference that the registered owner in question was driving the vehicle 
can probably serve as reasonable suspicion.87 However, Respondent 
notes that although the State’s burden is light, it is not excused from 
satisfying that burden.88 The State still must establish reasonable 
suspicion, and it failed to do so here.89 
Respondent argues this infringement of personal privacy is not 
justified by government interests.90 The State has provided no evidence 
that all drivers with revoked licenses are unsafe.91 Every state suspends 
licenses for non-driving reasons.92 For example, 47 Districts suspend for 
failure to pay child support and 8 for failure to pay a parking ticket.93 
In fact, “nearly 40 percent of [American] license suspensions are 
unrelated to traffic safety.”94 Drivers with licenses suspended for non-
traffic reasons are no more dangerous than the average driver.95 There 
is no record of why Glover’s license was revoked, which weakens the 
State’s safety-related justification.96 Additionally, the only instance 
where the State would need this bright line rule is in the absence of any 
observed traffic violations.97 Respondent also notes that the proposal 
would create a perverse incentive for officers to learn as little as 
possible about the driver of a vehicle in a world where the police 
already have an arsenal of traffic violations they can rely on for a 
detention.98 
Respondent argues that the traffic stops impose a serious burden 
on individuals.99 Respondent notes the large number of drivers in 
 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 36. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 37. 
 90.  Id. at 37–38. 
 91.  Id. at 39. 
 92.  See id. at 41 (discussing a nationwide assessment of license suspensions). 
 93.  Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Reasons for Driver License Suspension, 
Recidivism, and Crash Involvement Among Drivers with Suspended/Revoked Licenses (Jan. 2009). 
 94.  Id. (citing Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target the Poor, 
NPR (Jan. 5, 2015)). 
 95.  Id. at 42 (citing David J. DeYoung & Michael A. Gebers, An Examination of the 
Characteristics and Traffic Risks of Drivers Suspended/Revoked for Different Reasons, 35 J. 
SAFETY RES. 287, 290 (2004)). 
 96.  Id. at 42. 
 97.  Id. at 42–43. 
 98.  Id. at 43–44. 
 99.  Id. at 46. 
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America with suspended licenses, including 4.2 million people across 
five states for unpaid court debt alone.100 Each owner with a suspended 
license increases the likelihood that others in their home or community 
will drive that person’s vehicle.101 Any individual who does so may be 
subjected to seizure.102 Additionally, the growing prevalence of 
automated license-plate readers (“ALPRs”) increases the number of 
license plates that can be scanned, and therefore, the number of 
innocent drivers subject to seizure.103 Respondent also claims the stops 
are intrusive, at least more so than the inconvenience resulting from 
police checkpoints.104 
Finally, Respondent argues that the anxiety induced by a traffic stop 
is far greater than the State acknowledges.105 This is partly due to the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which allows officers to 
request identification,106 order all occupants of the vehicle to step out, 
and react to anything in plain view that gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause.107 These factors can lead to anxious and 
evasive behavior which, in turn, can also be components of reasonable 
suspicion.108 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should uphold the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
decision to affirm the district court’s order granting the suppression 
motion. The burden is on the State to prove reasonable suspicion.109 
Here, the State did not meet that burden. Reasonable suspicion 
requires “tak[ing] into account ‘the totality of the circumstances—the 
whole picture.’”110 The Court has consistently declined to let one fact 
 
 100.  Id. at 47 (citing Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Legal Aid Justice Ctr., Driven by Dollars: 
A State-by-State Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, at 1 
(2017)). 
 101.  Id. at 48. 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 49 (citing Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have Helped Police and 
Lenders Target the Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2016/04/how-license-plate-readers-havehelped-police-and-lenders-target-
the-poor/479436/). 
 104.  Id. at 50. 
 105.  Id. at 51. 
 106.  Id. at 51–52 (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004)). 
 107.  Id. at 52 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1997)).  
 108.  Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). 
 109.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). 
 110.  Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
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justify reasonable suspicion.111 Instead, prior Supreme Court opinions 
have expressed a desire to take a “mosaic” of factors into account to 
determine reasonable suspicion.112 
The State argues that Deputy Mehrer examined the totality of the 
circumstances in deciding to pull the vehicle over.113 It claims that 
Mehrer discovered that the vehicle was registered to someone with a 
revoked license, observed the vehicle was being driven, and knew 
driving a vehicle with a revoked license is a crime in the state of 
Kansas.114 These factors, the State argues, add up to a “totality of the 
circumstances.”115 This argument rings hollow for a variety of reasons. 
First, the State stipulated that Deputy Mehrer seized Glover “solely on 
the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked.”116 
The State is changing its strategy due to precedent indicating that 
reasonable suspicion is typically not supportable by only one fact. 
Second, two of the factors the State lists are pretextual. While 
knowledge that the vehicle in question was registered to someone with 
a revoked license is undoubtedly salient, Deputy Mehrer’s knowledge 
that the law prohibits driving with a suspended license and his 
observation of a vehicle in motion have little relevance to the State’s 
argument. These facts are prerequisites to any traffic stop, and they 
would allow any seizure to be justified by a “totality of the 
circumstances” if the Court accepted them as valid. The Court should 
reject the State’s effort to amalgamate a “totality of the circumstances” 
out of its only substantial fact. 
The State’s “totality of the circumstances” argument also does not 
square with the Court’s reasonable suspicion jurisprudence. 
Knowledge that crimes are illegal and observation of mundane actions 
have not been held to be relevant factors in prior reasonable suspicion 
cases. For instance, in Brown v. Texas, officers seized a man who was 
walking away from another person in an area with a high incidence of 
drug trafficking.117 The man was arrested for failing to identify 
himself.118 In holding that the man’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
 
 111.  E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975); Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 51–52 (1979). 
 112.  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). 
 113.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 15.  
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 19. 
 116.  State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 67 (Kan. 2018). 
 117.  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1979). 
 118.  Id. 49. 
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violated, the Court found the basis for the stop was rooted in only one 
factor: the man’s “suspicious” appearance.119 The Court did not use the 
facts that the neighborhood was notorious for drug trafficking or that 
drug trafficking was illegal in its consideration of reasonable suspicion. 
It should compare the facts of Brown to those in the current case and 
come to the same conclusion. There was no justification for Deputy 
Mehrer to initiate a stop outside of the fact the vehicle in question was 
registered to someone with a suspended license. This single fact should 
not reach the totality of the circumstances necessary to justify 
reasonable suspicion. 
The State argues it would be “poor police work” for Deputy Mehrer 
to not initiate the stop.120 On the contrary, some additional police work 
may have uncovered information that would have justified Deputy 
Mehrer’s actions. For example, if the officer positioned himself in a way 
to view the driver and ascertain his gender, he could have then matched 
the gender of the driver with the gender of the person carrying a 
suspended license. In fact, if Deputy Mehrer had been able to point to 
any inferences he made that were grounded in his training or 
experience as a police officer, those most likely would also justify 
reasonable suspicion. He did not do so. 
Generally speaking, adopting the bright line rule that the State 
proposes would be a mistake. The statistics on which the State relies to 
make its argument are misleading and incomplete. For example, the 
State uses the fact that the average vehicle has between two and three 
drivers to argue that there is at minimum a 33 percent chance the driver 
of a vehicle is its owner.121 This argument fails for a few reasons. First, 
it assumes those with suspended or revoked licenses will continue to 
drive at the same rate as the average driver, which ignores the natural 
deterrent effect that comes with a driver getting their license taken 
away.122 Second, reasonable suspicion is inherently “somewhat 
abstract.”123 The State attempts to distill an ambiguous idea into a hard 
statistic, which is antithetical to the nature of the standard. Third, 
 
 119.  Id. at 52. 
 120.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 15.  
 121.  Id. at 13 (citing The 10 States with the Most Suspended/Revoked Licenses, INSURIFY 
(June 4, 2018), https://insurify.com/insights/the-10-states-with-the-most-suspended-revoked 
licenses/). 
 122.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660 (1979) (noting that it is natural to think that 
“the unlicensed driver” would “be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a traffic 
violation or having some other experience calling for proof of his entitlement to drive”). 
 123.  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). 
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adoption of this rule would reward “poor police work.” If an officer 
runs a license plate and discovers it is registered to someone with a 
revoked license, that officer immediately becomes disincentivized from 
learning any additional information since he already has what he needs 
to justify the stop. 
Finally, the State’s proposed rule would run afoul of the inherent 
balance between the State’s interest in safety and the individual’s 
interest in privacy. Every search and seizure decision requires 
“balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the 
search [or seizure] entails.’”124 The State insists that these traffic stops 
are slight intrusions that are necessary to ensure public safety.125 That is 
not the case. The State understates the amount of harm traffic stops 
cause. The Court has emphasized the “physical and psychological 
intrusion” these stops cause as well as the “substantial anxiety” they 
create.126 Importantly, the cumulative effect of these stops cannot be 
ignored. Perfectly legal drivers would be subject to seizure every time 
they left the house purely because the transportation they rely on is 
registered to someone with a suspended license. This knowledge would 
surely compound the substantial anxiety a driver would experience 
every time they are pulled over or leave their residence. 
The safety benefits from this substantial intrusion are slight at best. 
First, licenses can be suspended for offenses completely unrelated to 
driving. There is nothing to suggest drivers with suspended licenses are 
more dangerous than average drivers, and there is certainly no 
advancement in public safety from the infringement on these drivers’ 
rights as well as the right of every person to drive vehicles registered to 
a member of this group. Second, inherent in the State’s proposal is that 
the driver being pulled over would be following every traffic law. If the 
driver is breaking any traffic laws, officers can simply pull him or her 
over for that. Therefore, officers would be seizing those who, by 
definition, are the safest drivers on the road at the time they are being 
pulled over. This hardly seems to be the crucial advancement in public 
safety the State purports it to be. 
 
 124.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–
37 (1967)) (alterations in original).  
 125.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 21. 
 126.  Delaware, 440 U.S. at 657. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should reaffirm the Fourth Amendment rights 
that citizens are guaranteed by the Constitution. To rule in favor of the 
State would be to diminish the reasonable suspicion standard into 
essential nothingness. It would defy common sense and precedent, and 
whatever marginal increase in public safety that would result would be 
more than counterbalanced by the social costs of an inevitable rise in 
traffic stops. The Court should uphold the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
ruling and find in favor of Respondent. 
 
